Recognizing
and dealing with storage and timing channels when performing the security analysis of a computer system is an elusive task. Methods of discovering and dealing with these channels for the most part have been ad hoc, and those that are not are restricted to a particular specification language.
This paper outlines a practical methodology for discovering storage and timing channels that can be used through all phases of the software life cycle to increase the assurance that all channels have been identified. The methodology is presented and its application to three different descriptions (English, formal specification, and high order language implementation) are discussed.
btroductian
When performing a security analysis of a system both overt and covert channels of the system must be considered.
Overt channels use the system's protected data objects to transfer information from one subject to another.
That is, one subject writes into a data object and another sub ject reads from the object; thus, information is tran#erred from one object to another. The channels are overt because the entity used to hold the information is a data object i.e., it is an object that is normally viewed as a data container. Examples of objects used for overt channels are buffers, files, and if o devices.
Covert channels, in contrast, use entities not normally viewed as data objects to transfer information from one siibject to another. These nondata objects such as file locks, device busy fiags, and the passing of time are needed to register the atate of the system. * Overt channels are controlled by enforcing the access control policy of the system being designed and impk+ mented.
The access control policy states when and how overt reads and writes of data objects may be made. Part of the security analyzis must verify that the implementation of the system correctly implements the stated access control
policy. An example of verification is the UCLA Data Secure Unix project
[2], Access control is not further addressed in this paper.
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q Note tlmt this detition of covert channels cWere hum that hltroduced by Lmnpson h MS original note on tlm confinement problem [1] . The covert chmumle as dkuseed in this paper include both storege end timing channels Recognizing and dealing with covert chzmnels is more elusive.
As stated above, objects used to hold the information being transferred are normally not viewed as data objects, but can often be manipulated maliciously to transfer information.
There are examples of these channels and methods for blocking them [1, 3, 4, 5, 6 ], However, methods to discover these covert channels for the most part have been ad hoc, and assurance that all storage and timing channels have been discovered has been lacking.
Previous work on flow analysis [7, 8] 
&lal@ngthe Matrix
Now tbet the shared resource matrix is complete it is necessary to use it to locate potential storage and timing channels.
From the criteria presented in Section 2 it can be seen that the only attributes that need be considered are those whose rows contain both an R and an M, 'Thus, for the example matrix of Figure 3 .1 the only attributes that need to be considered are Owner, Locked, In-Use Set, Buffer and Value, For discussion purposes assume that the access policy is defined as follows. For a process to read information from a file each of the security classes in the file's security class set must exist in the access rights set of the prccess with either read or read/write access, E this is the case, then the process is said to have "read access" for the file.
For a process to write information to-a file each of the security classes in the file's security class set must exist in the access rights set of the process with either write or read/write access. If this condition is satisfied the process is said to have "write access" for the file,?
For an attribute to be a potential storage channel one must be able to transfer information from one process to another in a direction that is not allowed by the access control mechanism. The same process that was used for the matrix constructed from the English requirements is applied again.
The resultant matrix is shown in Figure 3 .4.
A problem may occur when using the appr-ch outlined above to determine which attributes are referenced in an Ins Jo specification.
The problem arises because when using the Em Jo language if a variable is to be changed under certain circumstances, but not others, all circumstan ces must be described explicitly. This is not enforced by the specification processoq therefore, the Effect section of an I.na Jo transform may not be deterministic. For instance, a possible specification for the File_Locked tmansform is:
A"pl:Rocess (
Notice that this specification di.t7ers from the one that appears in Figure  3 .3. The interpretation of this specification is that if the executing process has write access to file f then the new value of the execut@ process's Result attribute will be true if file f is locked and false if it is not locked.
However, it does not specify what the value of the Result attribute will be if the executing process doesn't have write access to file fi nor does it specify what the new value of the Result attribute for the other processes will be. That is, this specification is equivalent to the following specification,
Jn the tna Jo language the meaning of N"var=N''var is that the variable var can assume any value in the new state.
Thus, its new value can be the result of referenĩ ng any of the state variables.
Therefore, when filling in the matrix for this type of specification one must assume the worst case. That is, it is assumed that all atate variables are referenced to determine the value of the Result attribute.
The column that corresponds to this transform would have an R in eve~row. Notice how this difTers from the value for the File-Locked column in Figure  3 .4. Thus, whenever the EfIects see tion of a transform is nondeterministic the user must assume that all shared attributes can be referenced.
The shared resource matrix generated from the Ina Jo specification is analyzed in the same manner es was described for the English requirements matrix.
hlplemenwion code
In this section the methodology is applied to implm entation code. Figure 3, 
